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Rematch?	The	constitutional	implications	of	a	second
EU	referendum
Is	a	second	EU	referendum	a	possibility?	Andrew	Blick	(King’s	College	London)	outlines	some
of	the	constitutional	issues	that	would	arise	should	a	second	referendum	take	place.	Unless	these
matters	are	given	serious	consideration,	holding	another	vote	is	unlikely	to	improve	matters	–	and
might	even	aggravate	them.
The	idea	of	a	second	EU	referendum	of	some	kind,	though	highly	controversial,	is	now	a
prominent	part	of	public	debate	in	the	UK.	Whatever	view	one	takes	of	the	first	vote,	it	is	hard	to
argue	that	the	UK	political	system,	or	indeed	the	country	as	a	whole,	was	fully	prepared	for	its	consequences.	At
present,	since	the	government	is	firmly	opposed	to	a	further	referendum,	the	civil	service	is	unable	to	prepare	for	the
eventuality	of	a	further	popular	vote.	Parliament	too,	whatever	the	private	views	may	be	of	majorities	in	both	Houses,
is	not	seriously	examining	what	it	might	mean	in	practice.
Part	of	the	problem	is	that	the	debate	is	a	proxy	for	the	continuing	division	on	the	fundamental	issue	of	EU
membership.	Even	to	countenance	the	possibility	of	a	further	vote	(though	Nigel	Farage	seemed	recently	to	entertain
this	idea)	could	be	depicted	as	a	concession	to	the	‘remain’	side	and	its	efforts	to	frustrate	the	popular	will.	Yet	to	rule
out	another	referendum	at	this	point	would	be	as	irresponsible	as	it	was	to	assume	that	there	would	be	no	‘leave’
majority	on	23	June	2016.
A	groundhog	greets	the	day.	Photo:	_Chag	via	a	CC-BY-NC-SA	2.0	licence
It	is	possible	to	conceive	of	circumstances	in	which	the	force	for	a	second	public	vote	becomes	irresistible.	If	it	does,
implementation	of	this	change	of	course	will	be	far	from	straightforward.	In	particular,	a	series	of	constitutional	issues
arise	that	it	is	proper	to	consider.
LSE Brexit: Rematch? The constitutional implications of a second EU referendum Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-01-19
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/01/19/rematch-the-constitutional-implications-of-a-second-eu-referendum/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
A	first	matter	is	the	precise	circumstance	in	which	a	decision	to	hold	a	second	referendum	could	take	place.	Would	it
take	place	before	or	after	a	final	agreement	was	arrived	at?	Perhaps	after	a	breakdown	in	talks,	if	one	occurs?	Might
it	follow	evidence	of	a	decisive	swing	in	public	opinion	against	Brexit,	or	the	particular	course	that	negotiations	had
taken	(perhaps	not	even	leading	to	a	deal),	or	at	least	in	favour	of	a	second	direct	consultation	with	the	public?	Could
some	wider	public	emergency	or	external	event	act	as	a	trigger?	Might	it	come	through	an	amendment	to	a	bill
secured	because	of	a	rebellion	in	the	Commons?	Following	a	defeat	for	the	government	in	one	or	both	Houses	of
Parliament	in	the	vote	that	has	been	promised	on	a	final	deal?	Or	because	a	government	decided	to	hold	a
referendum?	Would	it	accompany	the	resignation	of	the	Prime	Minister,	and	the	forming	of	another	Conservative
administration,	or	one	of	another	party	or	combination	of	parties?	Might	yet	another	General	Election	be	involved?	All
of	these	possibilities	would	have	important	implications	for	the	precise	context	in	which	the	referendum,	were	it	held,
took	place.	They	would	be	crucial	to	shaping	the	nature	of	the	decision	that	the	electorate	faced.
Second	is	the	precise	choice	that	might	be	on	offer	to	the	public.	The	possible	permutations	are	numerous.	If	a	binary
referendum,	would	it	be	between	a	deal	and	remaining;	or	between	no-deal	(if	talks	do	not	succeed)	and	remaining;
or	between	a	deal	or	exit	without	a	deal?	Might	one	of	the	options	on	offer	be	to	return	to	negotiations,	perhaps	to
seek	more	palatable	terms	(or	if	no	agreement	had	been	reached,	to	give	the	government	a	new,	more	flexible,
mandate)?	If	multiple	options	were	presented	to	the	public	–	presumably	remaining,	leaving	with	a	deal,	or	leaving
without	a	deal,	and	perhaps	returning	to	negotiations	–	how	would	the	result	be	calculated?
Third,	attention	should	be	given	to	who	would	vote	and	how	the	result	would	be	interpreted.	What	would	the
franchise	be	–	would	it	include	16-	and	17-year-olds?	Or	would	there	be	immense	pressure	to	use	the	same
electorate	as	in	2016?	Might	there	be	a	supermajority	requirement	or	threshold	of	some	kind?	Would	there	be	special
consideration	given	to	particular	results	in	England,	Northern	Ireland,	Scotland,	and	Wales?	Again,	it	might	be	difficult
to	justify	rules	that	differed	from	those	applied	in	the	previous	vote,	particularly	if	it	appeared	broadly	to	be	a	re-
staging	of	the	previous	contest,	offering	a	binary	‘remain’	or	‘leave’	option.	Furthermore,	were	a	supermajority
required,	to	which	option	or	options	would	it	apply?
Fourth	involves	the	management	of	the	referendum.	If	the	government	made	a	recommendation	to	vote	in	a
particular	direction,	how	would	Civil	Service	impartiality	during	the	pre-referendum	period	be	enforced?	Would	an
opt-out	from	collective	responsibility	for	dissenting	ministers	be	available,	and	if	so	how	would	it	be	managed?	When,
exactly,	would	the	referendum	take	place?	Given	emerging	suspicions,	still	shrouded	in	uncertainty,	about	campaign
irregularities	during	the	last	referendum,	how	could	the	authorities,	including	the	Electoral	Commission,	ensure	the
integrity	of	the	next	contest?
A	fifth	set	of	issues	relates	to	the	result	and	its	outcome.	Would	the	government	possess	the	necessary	legal
authority	to	act	upon	the	vote?	Might	we	anticipate	legal	complications	similar	to	those	that	manifested	themselves
with	the	Miller	case?	Would	the	legislation	providing	for	the	vote	also	seek	to	make	the	result	legally	binding,	or
would	it	be	technically	advisory,	as	was	the	previous	referendum?	If	the	logic	of	a	result	was	that	the	UK	should	seek
to	revoke	Article	50,	would	it	be	able	to	do	so	unilaterally?	Might	an	opinion	on	this	subject	need	to	be	sought	from
the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	in	advance	of	a	second	referendum?
The	strict	legal	issues	will	not	be	wholly	decisive	in	themselves.	Ultimately,	Parliament	cannot	bind	itself	and	would
probably	only	give	the	referendum	result	the	force	of	law	if	the	political	environment	was	judged	conducive	to	the
passing	of	such	a	provision.	After	all,	in	theory,	a	UK	government,	backed	by	Parliament,	could	reverse	the	Brexit
policy	without	any	further	referendum.	Yet	opponents	of	leaving	do	not	advocate	this	course.	Their	tactical	decision	to
press	for	a	second	referendum	arises	because	of	a	widely	held	judgement	among	political	protagonists	(and
seemingly	shared	by	a	significant	portion	of	the	wider	public).	They	believe	that,	whether	they	like	it	or	not,	and
regardless	of	its	formal	status	being	only	advisory,	they	are	obliged	to	implement	the	‘leave’	result.
Clearly,	departure	from	the	EU	could	potentially	take	place	in	a	range	of	different	ways.	One	possibility	would	be	to
maximise	continuity,	remaining	within	one	or	both	of	the	Single	Market	(or	parts	of	it)	and	the	Customs	Union,	but
exiting	institutions	such	as	the	European	Parliament,	European	Commission,	European	Court	of	Justice	and	so	on.
Some	would	regard	this	outcome	as	a	travesty	of	the	referendum	result,	but	it	would	still	arise	from	a	basic	desire	to
be	seen	to	fulfil	–	albeit	in	a	minimalist	sense	–	the	result	of	June	2016.	There	remains	a	powerful	political
assumption	that	this	referendum	overrides	any	other	type	of	democratic	mandate.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	supporters
of	leave	are	hostile	to	the	idea	of	a	second	vote,	while	advocates	of	remain	see	it	at	present	as	the	only	plausible
means	of	achieving	their	goal	(assuming	‘remain’	is	on	the	ballot	paper	in	some	way).
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To	hold	a	second	EU	referendum	might	be	seen	as	a	tacit	acknowledgement	not	only	that	the	first	has	failed	to	settle
the	issue	of	membership,	but	has	created	new	problems.	Given	such	an	assessment	of	the	use	of	this	political
mechanism,	how	can	we	be	sure	that	a	repetition	of	this	exercise	will	improve	matters,	rather	than	making	no
difference,	or	perhaps	even	aggravating	the	position?	If	‘remain’	were	not	made	available	as	a	possibility	in	a
referendum,	many	would	challenge	its	democratic	credibility.	Yet	if	to	seek	continued	membership	were	offered	to
voters	and	won,	opponents	of	this	outcome	–	who	(and	notwithstanding	the	recent	comments	by	Nigel	Farage)
already	portray	the	second	referendum	idea	as	improper	–	might	deny	the	legitimacy	of	the	result,	depicting	it	as	the
outcome	of	elite	manipulation.
Moreover,	as	we	now	know,	even	if	a	referendum	choice	is	binary,	there	are	many	different	kinds	of	result.	Different
divisions:	between	age	cohorts,	social	groups	and,	perhaps	most	importantly,	territories	of	the	UK,	all	have	an	impact
on	the	way	in	which	the	overall	vote	is	perceived.	So	too	do	the	overall	margin	of	victory	and	the	turnout.	What	would
be	the	response,	for	instance,	if	‘remain’	won	by	a	larger	percentage	than	had	‘leave’	in	2016,	but	with	a	smaller
absolute	vote	than	either	‘leave’	or	‘remain’	had	received	on	this	previous	occasion?	Any	of	these	variables	might
have	an	influence	on	the	potential	for	a	second	referendum,	not	only	to	reverse	(or	confirm)	the	previous	vote,	but
also	to	provide	some	kind	of	political	resolution	(though	the	policy	complications	that	will	follow	in	any	eventuality
would	be	great).	The	decisions	made	in	relation	to	the	various	constitutional	issues	raised	above,	therefore,	could
matter	greatly.	It	is	advisable	to	begin	closely	considering	the	options	now.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	is	a	shorter	version	of	an
article	that	first	appeared	on	the	Constitution	Society	blog	and	was	previously	published	at	LSE	British	Politics	and
Policy.
Andrew	Blick	is	Lecturer	in	Politics	and	Contemporary	History	at	King’s	College	London,	and	Director	of	History	&
Policy.
LSE Brexit: Rematch? The constitutional implications of a second EU referendum Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-01-19
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/01/19/rematch-the-constitutional-implications-of-a-second-eu-referendum/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
